

Demography, Ethnicity, and Prospects for Democracy by 2025

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State of the World (Demographically Speaking)

- The world is heading toward an unprecedented condition
- “Mature” societies with slow growth and abnormally aged populations will face “highly immature” societies with high growth and abnormally youthful populations
- Centers of global growth will shift to the Third World – BRICs

Mature vs. Immature societies

- Age ratios in young countries today:
45-50% under 14; 45-50% 15-59; 5% 60+
- Age ratios in mature countries today:
15-20% under 14; 60-65% 15-59; 20-25% 60+
- Age ratios in mature countries in 2030:
15% under 14; 50-60% 15-59; 25-35% 60+
- Total World Pop Growth, 2005-2025: 1.5 billion
- Total Pop Growth, LDCs, 2005-2025: 1.45 billion
 - Europe (-16 million), Japan (-6 million)

Mature Societies as Leaders

- Need to remain exemplars of the advantages of democracy
- Slow growth and reduced resources (financial, military) will not be attractive
- Conflicts over pensions, public spending, immigration will be viewed from abroad as tests.

Demographic Transition & Politics I

(Richard Cincotta)

- Phase A: Fall in Deaths, sustained high fertility
 - Rapid Population Growth (pressure on government services, education, infrastructure)
 - Large Youth Bulge (underemployment, easy mobilization, ideological fervor)
 - Rapid Urbanization (dependence, insecurity)
- Generally Bad for Democracy
 - Opportunity for patrons, populists, to take advantage of underemployed youthful population
 - Risks of disorder and lack of prosperity prompt 'authoritarian' solutions

Demographic Transition & Politics

II

- Phase B: Fall in births, low mortality & low fertility
 - Slowdown in population growth
 - Demographic Dividend (fewer dependents, higher savings rates)
 - Youth bulge dissipates
- Generally Good for Democracy
 - More human capital investment and higher physical capital ratio
 - Less unemployment, smoother socialization of youth
 - Less risk of disorder gives reforms a better chance to proceed without chaos or reversal

Prospects in BRICs

- Generally favorable, most are or have completed DT. Transitions to democracy have strong prospects of stability.
- Russia and China are exceptions, but China is moving (slowly) to open up its society
- Russia more like an oil-rich autocracy, where rents relieve need for reforms
- Main outliers (demographically): Egypt, South Africa; these remain at risk for non or failed transition to democracy

Prospects in Young, ethnically Riven societies


- Many ethnically riven societies are also not completing the DT
 - all of Sub-saharan Africa
 - Ecuador/Peru/Bolivia
 - Cambodia/Laos/PNG
 - Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan
- These remain in Phase A: demographic stress exacerbates ethnic divisions and reduces prospects for stable democracy.

Democracy and Social Change


- Democracy, in the end, depends on trust and breaking open closed and exclusive patronage nets; that means rule of law, accessible incomes, security. Large young and underemployed populations works against all of that; demographic dividend, economic growth, mature population works in favor.
- No magic bullets of narrow-focus change

TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE


HIERARCHY



POLYARCHY



Creating Factionalized Partial Democracy



Global Prospects for Democracy

- Mature states need to solve fiscal, immigration, and inequality problems
- BRICs need continued institutional reform
- Young and ethnically riven states need a more complex menu
 - Family planning and women's education
 - Job-rich development path
 - Global integration
 - Security and Rule of Law to weaken clientelism
- Wild Card: The 2 Billion – from producers to consumers; consequences for prices, environment, climate